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How we ought to diagnose, categorise and respond to spectrum disabilities such as autism and Attention Deficit/
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is a topic of lively debate. The heterogeneity associated with ADHD and autism is
described as falling on various continua of behavioural, neural, and genetic difference. These continua are
varyingly described either as extending into the general population, or as being continua within a given disorder
demarcation. Moreover, the interrelationships of these continua are likewise often vague and subject to diverse
interpretations.
In this paper, I explore geneticists' and self-advocates’ perspectives concerning autism and ADHD as continua.
These diagnoses are overwhelmingly analysed as falling on a continuum or continua of underlying traits, which
supports the notion of “the neurodiversity spectrum”, i.e., a broader swath of human neural and behavioural
diversity on which some concentrations of different functioning are diagnosed. I offer a taxonomy of conceptions
of the genetic, phenotypic, and endophenotypic dimensionality within and beyond these diagnostic categories,
and suggest that the spectrum of neurodiversity is characteristically endophenotypic.1. Introduction
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD) are behavioural disabilities with a genetic and neural
aetiology, classified as neurodevelopmental disorders. Characteristic of
each is that both their phenotypic presentation, i.e., the behavioural
features associated with them, and their genetic causation are subject to
vast variability. This phenotypic and genetic variability is found to be in
some sense continuous with the general population as well as across
diagnostic boundaries (Gaugler et al., 2014; Robinson et al., 2016; Tick
et al., 2016). In this essay, I discuss autism and ADHD together as diag-
nostic categories that each cover a heterogeneity of phenotypic presen-
tation, and that are illustrative of genetic, phenotypic and
endophenotypic overlap across diagnostic boundaries.
Also called intermediate phenotypes, endophenotypes are phenotypic
traits that are thought to mediate the causal pathway between genes andorm 5 July 2021
evier Ltd. This is an open accessother, more causally complex phenotypic traits (Cannon & Keller, 2006;
Kendler & Neale, 2010). For phenotypes such as ASD and ADHD, related
behavioural traits are such candidate endophenotypes. The possibility of
analysing continuity associated with these diagnoses as endophenotypic
affords opportunities for nuance beyond simply thinking of ASD and
ADHD as continua.
The diagnostic categories of ASD and ADHD in DSM-5 and ICD-11 are
more inclusive than their previous iterations. Psychiatry initially sought
to establish each disorder as a discrete and relatively homogenous
category, but recently, the trend has been towards awareness and
acceptance of their continuous character: not only have both categories
grown in scope with revisions of the disorder categories such as those
introduced by DSM-V and ICD-11, it has become commonplace, though
controversial, to recognise that individuals who do not satisfy the diag-
nostic criteria for ASD or ADHD may still display some features associ-
ated with these diagnoses and be “somewhere on the spectrum”. In whatarticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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though I will use ASD when referring specifically to the diagnostic
category.1
The relationship between self-advocacy movements and genetics
research has been fraught with tension, as genetics research has histor-
ically been connected to eugenic measures. In light of the widespread
practice of terminating pregnancies if the fetus tests positive for Down's
syndrome in prenatal screenings, there is a grave concern that genetic
research would be used to develop prenatal tests for autism with similar
consequences (Bumiller, 2009; Singh, 2016). However, thinking of
autism and ADHD as genetic also has helped counter harmful conceptions
of these disabilities. For example, appealing to genetic findings has hel-
ped advocates show that conceptions of autism as resulting from poor
parenting, such as Leo Kanner's influential ‘refrigerator mother’ theory
according to which autism was caused by parents' lack of emotional
warmth, are false (see Singh, 2016). Additionally, for some, including
many whose lived experiences include autism or ADHD, these findings
are construed as lending welcome validation for thinking of autism and
ADHD as falling within normal human variation (e.g., Reser, 2011;
Baron-Cohen, 2017). This idea is encapsulated in science journalist Steve
Silberman's claim that since most cases of autism are caused by “very old
genes that are shared widely in the general population while being
concentrated more in certain families than others”, autism should be
regarded as a “strange gift from our deep past” and a “valuable part of
humanity's genetic legacy” (Silberman, 2015, p. 470).
Both social inclusion programmes and genetic research thus
increasingly direct their attention to multiple traits associated with
ADHD and ASD; some of these traits are shared by the two disabilities,
whereas others pertain to one of the two. This comes with two significant
lines of thinking. First, there is an increasing tendency to picture autism
and ADHD as falling within a single, extensive spectrum of neuro-
diversity. Second, autism and ADHD in are increasingly conceived in
terms of many continua rather than one continuum. For example, for
autism, continua of social interaction, communication, sensory process-
ing, and specific interests, among others, have been proposed as a means
of acknowledging that autism varies in presentation on an individual
basis in a manner that cannot be reduced to the now obsolete continuum
of “high functioning” and “low functioning” autism (see, e.g., Ure et al.,
2018).2
The question then arises how the continuous character of disabilities
like autism and ADHD ought to be conceived. On closer analysis, there
are important differences in what sort of continua are seen as relevant for
these disabilities: whether the disorder itself is continuous, or whether it1 A note about language. In this paper, I follow the recommendation of the
Autistic Self-Advocacy Network (ASAN) in referring to ASD simply as ‘autism’
and in using identity-first language, that is, instead of “people with autism”, I
refer to “autistic people”. This is more in line with the claim embraced by many
autistic people and by the neurodiversity movement that autism is not some-
thing that a person has but rather a defining feature of the individual. I will
however refer to ASD when speaking of the diagnostic category, specifically.-
With regard to ADHD, I follow self-advocates in referring to it with that
acronym. The inattentive subtype of ADHD was at one point separated into its
own diagnostic category as ADD (Attention Deficit Disorder); the state-of-the-art
of research into ADHD does not support this distinction, and so I follow DSM-V
in using ‘ADHD’ to refer also to inattentive symptom presentation. I also use
‘disability’ instead of ‘disorder’ in order to follow the language endorsed by self-
advocates as less stigmatising. Furthermore, outside of direct quotations, I will
use ‘genetic effect’ in lieu of ‘genetic risk’, as the word ‘risk’ carries connotations
of harmfulness that I do not intend to convey. The overall medical language used
within this paper stems from its subject matter of genetics and is not intended as
an endorsement of what is sometimes called ‘the medical model’ over a social
model for disabilities such as varieties of neurodiversity.
2 Arguments proposed explicitly in terms of “high and low functioning”
autism have, however, been made fairly recently: for example, Jaarsma and
Welin (2012) suggest that there is a qualitative difference between the two, and
that “high functioning” autism should not be portrayed as a disability.
53emerges from continua of behavioural and neural endophenotypes.
Furthermore, there is heterogeneity in how these disabilities are placed
on those continua: for example, while some suggest a continuous mea-
sure of ADHD or autism that extends into the subclinical population,
others suggest that ADHD or autism is located in the ‘far end’ of an
associated continuum only.
In light of these considerations, and of the genetic, neural, and
behavioural overlap of the ADHD and autism categories, a further
question arises: disabilities classified as neurodevelopmental are often
described as being on “the spectrum”, i.e., on one continuous spectrum of
behavioural, neural, and genetic variance – or of “neurodiversity”, as the
term adopted by various advocacy groups and increasingly, also by ge-
netics researchers. If there is a continuous spectrum of neurodiversity,
what sort of a continuum is that spectrum?
In what follows, in section 2, I will first elaborate on the scientific and
social background of these questions, giving an overview of both the
status of autism and ADHD genetics and of their impact for autistic
people, people with ADHD, and their families. In section 3, I will expand
on various forms of trait continuity, explicating differences in approach
within autism and ADHD genetics research. In section 4, I discuss the
endophenotype approach, addressing endophenotypic continuum
models in ADHD and autism research and suggesting that “the spectrum”
is best understood as multidimensional and endophenotypic. For such an
endophenotypic conception of the relevant continuity, our categoriza-
tions of normality and divergence are placed on an expanse of continuous
variance of behavioural and neural traits. Such a conceptualization lends
support to pragmatism rather than reductionism about ADHD, ASD and
connected diagnoses.
2. Spectra of brain and behaviour: genetics and neurodiversity
2.1. ADHD and autism: stories of expansion
Both ADHD and autism are characterised by a set of behavioural
features that need not all be present for diagnosis. The most salient such
features for ADHD are differences in attention, impulse control, and
motor activity; for autism, they include differences in communication,
repetitive activity, sensitivity to sensory information, and difficulties in
social interaction (DSM-V, ICD-11).
As a psychiatric category, what is now denoted as Autism Spectrum
Disorder has gone through marked revisions in responses to changes in
how it has been perceived within the scientific, clinical, and advocacy
communities. While autism was initially thought of as a narrow, ho-
mogenous category,3 it has subsequently broadened in scope. In response
to the growing heterogeneity within the category, it was divided into
multiple categories: Asperger's syndrome and pervasive developmental
disorder-not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS) were introduced into DSM-
IV and ICD-10 disorder classifications in the early 1990s, and then
recombined with autism into the umbrella category of Autism Spectrum
Disorder in DSM-V and ICD-11 during the 2010s (Navon & Eyal, 2016;
Singh, 2016).
A similar trajectory of expansion, division, and recombination is
characteristic of ADHD. Originally introduced in the second DSM as
Hyperkinetic Impulse Disorder, it was named Attention Deficit Disorder
in DSM-III and listed as having two distinct subtypes: ADD with or
without hyperactivity. DSM-III-r, released in the late 1980s, responded to
inconsistencies in subtyping patients by removing the hyperactivity
distinction and changed the name to ADHD (Lange et al., 2010). But
already in DSM-IV, subtypes were reintroduced as predominantly
hyperactive-impulsive type, predominantly inattentive type, and com-
bined type. With DSM-V, subtypes were transformed into symptom3 This discussion focuses on recent developments concerning the scope of
these categories and omits much of the broader history of autism and ADHD. For
a fuller history of autism, see, e.g., Silberman (2015) and Singh (2016).
4 The word has since grown further denotations: in addition to its original
meaning, it is often used to denote the neurodiversity movement, which en-
dorses the view that autism and other neurodevelopmental disabilities are
within the range of normal human variation and are not illnesses to be cured.
The word is also often used to refer to neurodevelopmental disabilities, some-
times called “neurodiversity conditions”.
5 Thinking of various diagnoses as placed on a spectrum is not unique to
autism, ADHD, and associated neurodevelopmental diagnoses. For example, the
conception of “the schizophrenic spectrum” encompasses magical thinking,
schizotypal personality, schizoid personality and schizophrenia proper. See
Kendler et al. (1995).
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tation may not reflect a different disorder aetiology. Diagnostic criteria
were also expanded to better accommodate for diagnosing adults with
ADHD.
While there are important differences in the histories of ADHD and
autism nosology, they also have some striking similarities. In both cases,
changes in the disorder categorisation have reflected the struggles of the
psychiatric community to reckon with the expansion of what was initially
conceived of as a homogeneous and discrete phenomenon into a charac-
teristically heterogeneous category. During each expansive process,
breaking categories into distinct diagnoses or subtypes reflects a wish for
greater consistency within a category, consistency that was hoped to come
with important clinical advantages. However, even if the current cate-
gories allow for striking heterogeneity within a diagnostic category, wishes
for homogeneity are not a matter of the past alone. Instead, such desiderata
continue to be reflected in the endeavours of various revisionary projects
within psychiatry, such as the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) move-
ment, which urges the radical revision of disorder categories to better align
them with distinct biological causes, which the movement believes will
translate into improved clinical efficacy (Insel & Cuthbert, 2015). As such
hopes have failed tomaterialise, at least for the time being, others embrace
broader umbrella categories as reflecting the broad swath of ‘neuro-
divergent’ behaviour, and as better enabling clinicians to help provide care
and services for patients with heterogeneous symptom presentations.
Both autism and ADHD are popular subjects of genetic research, with
recent meta-analyses placing heritability estimates on a range between
64% and 91% for ASD and at 74%–88% for ADHD, respectively (Tick et al.,
2016; Faraone & Larsson, 2019). As the categories have expanded, the
actual genetic heterogeneity associated with them has increased (see, e.g.,
Navon & Eyal, 2016). The consensus is that both autism and ADHD are
polygenic, that is, caused by a large number of genes rather than by a single
genetic cause, with the notable exception of rare monogenic syndromes
such as the fragile X syndrome that are associated with a small number of
autistic people (Singh, 2016; Faraone & Larsson, 2019, p. 130).
Parallel to a growing conception of the behavioural profiles of autism
and ADHD as continuous in character has been an increasing interest in
researching these disorder demarcations using the methods of quantita-
tive genetics. Methodologies such as the traditional twin study and
Genome-Wide Association Study have typically postulated ASD and
ADHD to be discrete phenotypes: GWAS focus on ascertaining the prev-
alence and distribution of a given phenotype in the population, whereas
twin studies assess its familiality and heritability. By contrast, quantita-
tive approaches to genetics treat the traits as varying in degree rather
than categorically. For these approaches, the relevant traits are assumed
to be subject to continuous variation; examples of non-controversially
continuous traits include human height and blood pressure. When ASD
and ADHD are researched by quantitative genetic methods, the contin-
uous trait under study is either the ASD or ADHD category simpliciter, or
associated behavioural or neurobiological traits.
While the heterogeneity within the ASD and ADHD categories is
uncontroversial, whether these categories are in some sense continuous
within the general population or discontinuous it is subject to contro-
versy. The source of this controversy lies, in part, in conceptions of this
heterogeneity as falling on a continuum. While not all heterogeneity is
continuous in character, ADHD and ASD are described as dimensional,
i.e., as such that their internal heterogeneity is continuous. In the case of
Autism Spectrum Disorder, the current terminology evokes continuity in
both the name – the spectrum metaphor evoking a gradient of colours –
and description; as for ADHD, continuity is a feature of the diagnostic
criteria which are explicitly of a threshold character, specifying a number
and duration of symptoms a patient must present with in order to be
diagnosed (DSM-V, ICD-11).
It however remains unclear what sort of continuity these categories
admit to, and conceptions of how the relevant heterogeneity falls on a
continuum differ. For example, some endorse the view that a gradient of
continuous diversity can be found within the relevant category; this view54is reflected in the dimensional approach permeating the characteriza-
tions of autism and ADHD in the DSM-5 and ICD-11 diagnostic manuals.
For others however, the relevant continuity extends into the general
population. For these conceptions, the clinical categories simply mark
part of a broader continuum (see, e.g., Plomin et al., 2009; Robinson
et al., 2016; Tick et al., 2016; Faraone & Larsson, 2019). Within psy-
chiatric genetics as well as advocacy movements, support for conceptions
of heterogeneity as continuity is inferred from genetic research. Explo-
rations of this continuity are motivated not just by the clinical and sci-
entific aims of discovering the biological processes involved in autism
and ADHD, but also by the aim of probing to what extent autism and
ADHD are continuous with – or amount to – normal human variation.
In section 3, I discuss these approaches further, terming them the
Simple Spectrum Model and the Far End Model, respectively.
2.2. Genetics research and neurodiversity approaches
The neurodiversity movement grew out of the desire of autistic self-
advocates to gain acceptance for their difference rather than be ‘cured’
of something central to their identity. While the autistic self-advocacy
community were early adopters of the term, the term ‘neurodiversity’
was originally not intended to refer to autism alone. Its coiner, socio-
logist Judy Singer, intended it to be similar to the concept of biodi-
versity and to simply refer to the vast variation in neural structure and
functioning within the entire human population – including, but not
limited to, those whose variation is subject to medical attention. Neural
difference, for Singer, was analogous to categories like gender and race
in that it characterised individual differences that have a pervasive
impact on lived experience and that are linked to structures of
oppression (Jaarsma&Welin, 2012; Baron-Cohen, 2017).4 The spectrum
is a metaphor central for the neurodiversity movement. A spectrum is a
multicoloured continuum. While many continua of genes, brains, and
behaviour may be relevant for neurodiversity, the spectrum (if not
further qualified as, e.g., the autism spectrum) is understood to be an
overarching umbrella continuum of neurodiversity, and self-advocates
often describe themselves as being ‘on the spectrum’ (see also Singh,
2016, pp. 160–161).5
The neurodiversity movement has grown to gradually encompass
other diagnoses classified as neurodevelopmental disorders than just
ASD, such as ADHD, dyslexia, dyspraxia, and Tourette's syndrome
(Jaarsma & Welin, 2012); as a result, these disorders, too, are increas-
ingly seen as part of the spectrum. Indeed, the neurodevelopmental
character of a diagnosis has typically been seen as that which distin-
guishes the neurodiverse minorities from other psychiatric patients.
The classification of diagnoses as ‘neurodevelopmental’ pools
together diagnoses of atypical behaviour with an early onset and postu-
lated neurobiological aetiology. This categorisation is under some criti-
cism, as the psychiatric community is beginning to understand that
environmental, genetic, and neural causes can be discovered for any
diagnostic category and thus the designation of a disorder as ‘neuro-
developmental’may be one of convention rather than a bright line found
in nature (see, e.g., Stein et al., 2020). Correspondingly, some
self-advocates no longer support a strict distinction between neuro-
developmental and mental illness.
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disabilities like ADHD and autism as heritable and neural has given rise
to a powerful narrative of a minority with ‘different brains’ (see, e.g.,
Ortega, 2009). Depictions of autism locating the source of atypical
behaviour in differences in physical function rather than, e.g., trauma
enabled the drawing of comparisons between this minority and disability
movements, such as with Deaf culture, which provided inspiration for
early autism self-advocates. Similarly, the physiological depiction has
had a large impact in how persons with ADHD and their families navigate
that disorder, giving rise to both essentialising and exculpating discourse
(Brinkmann, 2014; Koi, 2020; Lebowitz et al., 2016).
The relationship of autistic and ADHD people and their families with
genetics research is complex, and largely shaped by the connection of
genetic research with the medical aim of ‘curing’ individuals of their
autism or their ADHD. The history of autism research and clinical prac-
tice is teeming with efforts to cure patients of their autism, often using
methods that did more harm than good, or else, to prevent the birth of
autistic children. Parent organisations have had an important historical
role in promoting genetic and other medical research into autism with
the hope of finding a ‘cure’ (Singh, 2016).
Within self-advocacy movements however, genetic research is
rarely embraced. There are multiple reasons for the cautious relation-
ship between self-advocates and genetics. First, genetic research has
been historically associated with eugenic measures against the birth of
autistic children (Bumiller, 2009; Singh, 2016; see also; Paul, 1998),
and this historical background continues to be a source of warranted
caution. Second, it remains focused on finding a ‘cure’ for, or pre-
venting autism, which is in friction with the self-advocacy movement's
central tenet that autism is a way of being rather than a disorder to be
cured or prevented. Third, within autism research, research into ge-
netics gets the lion's share of research funding, eclipsing issues that
many autistic people see as much more important, such as research on
improving access to services and quality of life (Pellicano et al., 2014;
Singh, 2016).
However, genetic information has also been used within the neuro-
diversity movement to provide empirical support for the claim that autistic
traits are part of normal human variation, as well as to refute false claims
linking autism to vaccines or poor parenting. It has been of paramount
importance for the neurodiversity movement to show that autism is of a
biological origin and an integral part of human phenotypic variation, that
autistic behavioural traits are causally connected to the different brains
and different genes of autistic individuals rather than a product of toxic
parenting by ‘refrigerator mothers’,6 environmental toxins, or else an
artifice of postmodern society (Bumiller, 2009; Singh, 2016).
For ADHD, some critical approaches continue to contest its viability
as a target of psychiatry and to assert that the label of ADHD is an artifice
amounting to the medicalisation of childhood (Timimi & Taylor, 2004).7
Such claims are seen by many as contesting the validity of the lived ex-
periences of people with ADHD and blaming them and their families for
their different functioning. Findings concerning neural and genetic var-
iants connected to ADHD are seen as valuable for refuting those claims
(Koi, 2020).
Genetic research thus seems a double-edged sword: while genetic
research remains connected to stigmatising practices, genetic6 The ‘refrigerator mother’ theory of autism, promoted by Leo Kanner, was
very influential in the first decades of autism research. The blame it placed on
parents for their children's’ autism is a chief explaining factor for the instru-
mental role parent organisations have had on promoting genetics research, and
critical responses to Kanner's theory led to the rise of the neurodevelopmental
account of autism. See Singh (2016) for a nuanced discussion of this history.
7 It may be no coincidence that those criticising the category of ADHD as an
oppressive artifice often also are those criticising ASD for the same. See, e.g.,
Timimi (Timimi & Taylor, 2004 – in which Taylor disagrees with Timimi;
Timimi et al., 2010), who argues that both ADHD and autism amount to cultural
constructs that oppress boys and men.
55information is also seen as validating autistic and ADHD identities. In a
qualitative study interviewing autistic people and their families, Jennifer
Singh reports multiple interviewees viewing genetics as central to their
autistic identity:
[One] self-diagnosed parent viewed medication as merely “masking”
what one really was, which was “determined by what your genetics
allows you to be.” […] Similarly, a younger participant with a diag-
nosis of Asperger's viewed genetics as what “defines the core of a
person.” (Singh, 2016: 168)
Notions such as these, while not universal, are powerful instances of
what Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) term genetic essentialism: a set of
cognitive biases that connect the idea that something is genetic to notions
that it is immutable, has a specific aetiology, is discrete, and that it is
natural. These biases are in no way specific to autism and ADHD, and
have been observed in lay and professional thinking about categories as
diverse as race and gender (ibid.). However, for advocates of the neu-
rodiversity approach, this unlocks a powerful combination of ideas. In-
formation about the heterogeneity and continuity of genetic causation of
autism and ADHD, including the fact that nearly all of the associated
genetic variants are also found in the general population, combined with
the common notion that genetics is associated with authenticity, natu-
rality, and immutability, is interpreted as vindicating the claims that
neurodiversity is an essential and natural part of human interpersonal
variation, and that ADHD and autism are essential parts of the authentic
selves of autistic and ADHD people.
3. Which continua, which spectra?
As mentioned above, the heterogeneity of both ADHD and autism is
uncontroversial. Likewise, seemingly uncontroversial is conceiving of
their heterogeneity as in some sense continuous in character, as
expressed in the spectrum metaphor within the ASD diagnostic label and
within common usage in lay and scientific discussion of both diagnoses.
However, how these continua are conceived is subject to diversity that
may be, in part, obscured by the ubiquitous agreement of the spectral
character of each disability. The heterogeneity associated with ADHD
and autism is described as falling on various continua of behavioural,
neural, and genetic difference. These continua are varyingly described as
extending into the general population, or as being continua within a given
disorder demarcation. Moreover, the interrelationships of these continua
are likewise subject to diverse interpretations. Table 1, below, provides a
glossary of some basic concepts of continuity, similarity and diversity,
illustrating their interrelationships.
In the next sections, I discuss the polygenic causation and heteroge-
neous presentation of these disabilities, as well as the multiple concep-
tions of continuity arising from this diversity and causal complexity.3.1. The ASD and ADHD phenotypes as continua
One source of conceptions of heterogeneity as continuity is purely
methodological: many clinical self-report and parent-report in-
struments, such as the Autism-Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001) and a variety of ADHD rating scales (see Taylor et al., 2011 for a
review) operate on a continuum as a matter of clinical convenience.
Results are quantified, and given thresholds on a continuous, numeral
scale are given diagnostic significance. This instrumentation has, in
turn, informed clinical and research conceptions of both phenotypes as
admitting to both clinical and subclinical gradation under varying
conceptions, such as the notion of the ‘broader autism phenotype’
(Piven et al., 1997; Austin, 2005), a construct demarcating the pres-
ence of behavioural features similar to autism but insufficient for
diagnosis.
However, how the results of research using methods quantifying the
autism and ADHD phenotypes are interpreted no longer qualifies as purely
Table 1
Concepts of similarity, continuity and diversity. The wealth of overlapping concepts
of continuity and heterogeneity is one source of confusion. The above table
clarifies the interrelationships of some of these concepts (under their typical
denotations).
Concepts of similarity, continuity and diversity
Homogeneity Members of a category are similar to each other.
Heterogeneity Members of a category are different from each other.
Discreteness An object is discrete when it is not continuous with adjacent
objects, so that adjacent objects are distinct from each other.
Continuum Objects on a continuum differ from each other by small
increments, so that adjacent objects are difficult to distinguish
from each other, but distal objects on the continuum are distinct
from each other.
Dimension In psychology and psychiatry, a feature, symptom or trait
operationalized as a measurable continuum.
Multidimensional Consisting of a set of dimensions.
Network model A model of a trait or diagnosis as consisting of a heterogeneous,
causally interrelated set.
Threshold On a continuum, a point at which a meaningful difference
occurs, either as a result of labelling conventions or because
emergent properties arise.
Spectrum A figurative expression for a multidimensional continuum.
Table 2
Making sense of the spectrum. There are multiple competing ways of understanding
ADHD and autism as continua. This table summarises these approaches. The
Simple Spectrum and Far End models are characteristically phenotypic and are
discussed below. By contrast, the Network Continua, and Complex Spectrum
models rely on endophenotypic conceptions of autism and ADHD. A fuller dis-
cussion of these can be found in sections 4.1 and 4.2. For the Emergent Far End
model, the phenotype can be conceived of as an emergent property of either a
genetic or endophenotypic continuum and is discussed under sections 3.2. and
4.2., respectively.
Making sense of the spectrum: Various models of genetic, phenotypic and
endophenotypic continuity for autism and ADHD
Simple Spectrum ADHD or autism is conceived of as a single phenotypic
continuum extending throughout the general
population, wherein everyone can be placed
somewhere on this continuum.
Far End On a single phenotypic continuum extending
throughout the general population, only the far end of
this continuum is labelled as ADHD or autism.
Emergent far end
(genotype)
At a given concentration of genetic effect, a tipping
point is reached where ADHD or autism emerges as a
discrete phenotype.
Network Continua Multiple endophenotypic traits each constitute a
continuum. Autism or ADHD refers to a causally
interconnected set of discrete continua.
Complex Spectrum Multiple endophenotypic traits each constitute a
continuum. These dimensions furthermore are not
discrete from each other, but instead blur into each
other, forming a vast multidimensional continuum.




At a given threshold on an endophenotypic continuum,
a tipping point is reached where ADHD or autism
emerges as a discrete phenotype.
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entific and lay conceptions of autism and ADHD that the clinical phe-
notypes in question simply are gradated.11 For these conceptions, there is
assumed to be a unitary gradient of the disability in question (that the
quantitative instrumentation captures rather than creates). Within this
unitary gradient, instances of the disability are assumed to admit to
differences in quantifiable intensity.
This conception is also evident in DSM-5. For ASD, DSM-5 is explicit
about this consensus, stating that “[m]anifestations of the disorder also
vary greatly depending on the severity of the autistic condition, devel-
opmental level, and chronological age; hence, the term spectrum”
(DSM-5: 54, italics in the original). This intra-category continuity is
operationalized as levels of severity in the DSM-5. For ADHD,
intra-category continuity is built into its diagnostic criteria, as the criteria
specify a requirement of six or more symptoms of inattention and/or
hyperactivity and impulsivity. The number and distribution of symptoms
among individuals past that diagnostic threshold is therefore varied.
The view that the relevant gradient would be limited in scope to the
interpersonal variance within the diagnostic category alone, i.e., that the
difference between ‘mild’ and ‘extreme’ cases of a disability is one of
degree but that the difference between the clinical and subclinical pop-
ulations is categorical, is largely obsolete: instead, as expressions such as
that there is an “opposite end of the distribution” (Plomin et al., 2009)
signify, a continuous distribution of genes and traits crossing diagnostic
boundaries is widely accepted.
However, that the relevant phenotypic continuum extends into the
general population is no mere postulate, but instead evidence for this
conception is gleaned from findings in fields such as evolutionary psy-
chology (Reser, 2011) and most prominently, quantitative genetics
(Abrahams & Geschwind, 2008; Plomin et al., 2009; Robinson et al.,
2016; Faraone& Larsson, 2019). For such an approach, the turn of phrase
that someone is ‘a little bit autistic’ or ‘a touch ADHD’ is no mere met-
aphor but rather something that science can measure and verify.
Postulating a phenotype as continuous is by no means a methodo-
logical necessity for quantitative genetic approaches: while quantitative
genetics is a natural approach for the genetic research of continuous
phenotypes, the statistical methods of quantitative genetics are suited for
the study of any phenotype produced by a large group of small, additive11 Within the DSM, this belief is made more explicit for ASD than it is for
ADHD; however, the transition from a categorical approach to a dimensional
one cuts through the whole manual, including its section on ADHD, reflecting
beliefs about the gradated nature of both diagnoses.
56genetic and environmental effects, including phenotypes that are binary
and discrete.8 Nevertheless, the continuous character of the autism and
ADHD phenotypes has been argued for by both neurodiversity advocates
and geneticists, particularly those using quantitative methodology. For
example, Elise Robinson and colleagues express concern that “categorical
psychiatric diagnoses (for example, yes/no for ASD) ignore the possi-
bility of intermediate outcomes” (Robinson et al., 2016, p. 552), urging
that autism be assessed as a continuous trait that is not limited to the
clinical population.
In brief, there are meaningful differences among conceptions of
ADHD or autism as gradated. I will here introduce a brief taxonomy of
these conceptions (see Table 2), and a full discussion of the first two of
them; other conceptions will be discussed in full in the subsequent
sections.
The first two approaches outlined in Table 2 are the phenotypic
Simple Spectrum model and the phenotypic Far End model. These ap-
proaches each postulate a single gradient of ADHD or autism. For the
Simple Spectrum model, a gradient of the disability in question extends
across the human population. A value of autism or ADHD can be thus
ascribed to any person, similarly to blood pressure. That does not mean
that a higher measure would not be clinically significant: rather,
thresholds of clinical and social care can be established even if the trait is
presumed ubiquitous. Faraone and Larsson (2019), for example, endorse
such a phenotypic Simple Spectrum model for ADHD9:
The dimensional nature of ADHD has wide-ranging implications. If
we view ADHD as analogous to cholesterol levels, then diagnostic
approaches should focus on defining the full continuum of “ADHD-
traits” along with clinically meaningful thresholds for defining who8 Note also that the distinction between quantitative and qualitative traits is
itself not as clear as is commonly conceived. See Serpico (2020).
9 There are other proponents of the simple spectrum view, including Plomin
et al. (2009) who endorse such a view for all common disorders.
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toring. (Faraone & Larsson, 2019: 569)
Likewise for the phenotypic Far End model, a gradient of quantitative
behavioural phenotypic difference is extended into the general popula-
tion. For the Far End model however, the autism and ADHD demarcation
is reserved to the quantitative far end of the continuum and the term is
not extended throughout the population. The difference, while largely
semantic, carries a large symbolic and social justice weight: for example,
some are concerned that describing everyone as being ‘a touch ADHD’
can trivialise the real struggles faced by those with that disability. Like-
wise, in a qualitative study by Botha, Dibb, and Frost (2020), autistic
participants all resisted the notion that one could be ‘a little bit autistic’.
For continuous phenotypes, the question becomes where the thresh-
olds of clinical attention (for the Simple Spectrum model) or the
thresholds of disorder demarcation (for the Far End model) ought to be
placed. Philosophers arguing that psychiatric categories are not discrete
have often endorsed that categories be drawn in a pragmatist manner
(see, e.g., Zachar, 2014): even as the thresholds of demarcation are not
arbitrary, there is arguably a grey area within which the threshold can be
freely placed, but the placement ought to be informed by what best helps
us fulfil our various goals for the demarcation, e.g., the provision of
services and care. For disabilities such as autism and ADHD, however, the
placement of the threshold touches on issues of identity and of stigma.
Individuals sometimes have strong views concerning which side of the
boundary their individual phenotypic presentation belongs. For example,
the merging of the Asperger's syndrome diagnosis into the ASD category
was welcomed by others while resisted by a small minority wishing to
assert their relative capabilities compared to other autistic people and
perceiving their Asperger's diagnosis as validating that self-perceived
relative superiority, a view other autistic self-advocates describe as
ableist (see De Hooge, 2019). On the Simple Spectrum model, threshold
placement becomes less fraught an issue, as the thresholds are more
transparently pragmatic in character.
There may bemore than one threshold of interest for each continuum.
For example, Faraone& Larsson interestingly suggest multiple thresholds
of clinical attention. Applying the multiple thresholds approach to
ADHD, for example, thresholds for medication, cognitive behavioural
therapy, training for parents, and increased support in education may fall
on different points along the ADHD continuum. This stands at a contrast
to providing care and services only when a single diagnostic threshold is
crossed. Likewise, the conception of the ‘broader autism phenotype’ in-
vites the consideration of more than one threshold of social and/or
clinical consideration – but does it in Far End terms, describing a con-
tinuum with the autism and the broader autism phenotype each as
denoting a significant ‘concentration’ of the phenotype. As Faraone &
Larsson's analysis suggests, even as the concept of the ‘broader autism
phenotype’was originally motivated by the quest towards understanding
the familiality of autism, a similar conception of multiple thresholds of
significant ‘concentration’ of a single autism continuum may be an
informative operationalisation for purposes beyond genetics. One such
domain concerns the provision of accommodations and care for persons
with autistic traits whose trait presentation does not however cross the
diagnostic threshold.10 As for heritability that is not accounted for by known genetic causes, often
referred to as “missing heritability”, a hypothesis for both ADHD and ASD is that
private or low-frequency variants, including copy number variants, can help
account for the missing heritability (see Franke et al., 2009) as can rare de novo
mutations (see Singh, 2016, p. 104).3.2. Genetic continua for ASD and ADHD
As the scientific community reckons with the startling heterogeneity
within the autism and ADHD categories, the growing consensus has
become that there is no unitary essence for either of these phenotypic
continua. While each behavioural phenotype is largely caused by neural
and genetic differences, those neural and genetic differences are them-
selves subject to vast heterogeneity (Gaugler et al., 2014; Faraone &
Larsson, 2019). For ADHD, twelve loci of genome-wide significance were
implicated in a recent GWAS meta-analysis (Demontis et al., 2019).
However, the meta-analysis also confirmed what other studies had57suggested before, namely, that the polygenic effect of many common
gene variants, each with very small effects, accounts for a significant
portion of ADHD's heritability.10 The genetic story of autism is likewise
complex and most genetic variation associated with ASD can also be
found in the general population (Robinson et al., 2016; Tick et al., 2016).
Like phenotypic heterogeneity, genetic heterogeneity is con-
ceptualised as continuous in character. Outside of instances of autism
caused by rare de novo mutations, both ADHD and autism are associated
with a large range of genetic effects. These myriad effects are seen as co-
contributing to autism and ADHD, so that the more such effect is present,
the larger the likelihood of presenting with either phenotype. This idea is
encapsulated in the concept of genetic risk or liability (hereafter genetic
effect), which denotes the cumulative effect of many genes each with a
small effect on the phenotype.
The description of the genetic effect as cumulative and quantifiable
produces a notion of the genetic effect for autism or ADHD as itself being
on a continuum. For polygenic quantitative approaches, for each
phenotypic continuum, there is a covariant genetic continuum. More-
over, the continuity of the genotype is thought to provide evidence for
conceiving of the phenotype as continuous, despite that the precise
causal pathways between the polygenic effect and the heterogeneous
phenotype are subject to less consensus. For example, conceptions of a
‘broader autism phenotype’ (Piven et al., 1997; Austin, 2005) are justi-
fied with genetic information, rather than, e.g., with pragmatic consid-
erations of extending care or accommodations to a relevant segment of
the population below the ASD diagnostic threshold. In light of this
approach, the genetic differences associated with ADHD on one hand and
autism on the other are almost entirely quantitative in character (Faraone
& Larsson, 2019; Robinson et al., 2016; Tick et al., 2016).
The correspondence of the two continua must be postulated for sta-
tistical methods such as quantitative genetic studies to be carried out,
rather than being simply taken as an operationalisation. However, the
continuous genotype-phenotype mapping appears to be widely accepted
as something found in nature rather than as, at least in part, a function of
the methodology. As Serpico (2020) notes, even as the quantitative
approach highlights the complexity of polygenic causation, it also in-
volves and endorses methodological simplifications of those causal re-
lationships, such as additivity. That the linear mapping is taken as a fact
rather than a conceptual construct is evident from the way in which the
linearity of the genetic variation is taken to advise us on the matter of
whether the phenotype is best understood as a discrete kind or as a
continuum. For example, Tick et al. (2016) position themselves against
conceptions of ASD as a discrete category based on the continuity of the
genetic variance:
[T]here is not much evidence for nonlinearity of heritability across
the distribution of a quantitative ASD measure, which suggests that
ASD as disorder can be conceived as the extreme of ASD symptoms/
behaviours rather than being a distinct disorder (Tick et al., 2016:
593)
However, whether the genetic effect is linear need not entail that the
phenotype would be similarly distributed. This holds for normal and
skewed distribution alike: the distribution of the phenotype need not
follow the distribution of the genotype, as the causal pathways from
genotype to phenotype are not direct. As a result, it does not follow from
the linearity identified through statistical studies, such as heritability
studies, that the phenotype would be best conceived of on either a Simple
Spectrum or Far End model. Rather, the viability of a Far End model is a
function of defining the relevant phenotype.
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ever; I term this the Emergent Far End model. For this approach, the
phenotype is modelled as an emergent property of genetic effect under
suitable circumstances. As a result, the genetic effect is continuously
distributed in a given population, but the phenotype is only present at the
far end, not as a matter of convenience but because a tipping point is
reached where the cumulative genetic effects together produce a prop-
erty that would not be present at smaller levels of effect. The emergent far
end model therefore suggests a real, measurable emergent effect rather
than a pragmatist or nominalist restriction of diagnostic vocabulary to a
far end of variation. For this model, however, the dimensionality of the
phenotype presents a problem. Traits associated with disabilities such as
ADHD and autism – i.e., their endophenotypes – can be found in non-
affected family members (Piven et al., 1997; Austin, 2005; Navon &
Eyal, 2016; Singh, 2016; Beauchaine & Constantino, 2017; Koi, 2020).
The tipping point conceptualization would predict nonlinear distribution
of these traits even when the distribution of genetic effect is linear. Given
the sparse evidence of such nonlinearity of the distribution of these traits
(Tick et al., 2016), it is unlikely that a clear genotype to phenotype
tipping point can be found for autism or ADHD. A similar tipping point
can also be considered on the endophenotypic rather than genotypic
continuum; this possibility will be discussed in section 4.2.
4. Endophenotypes on the spectrum
At first sight, the continuous approach to ADHD and autism seems
well in line with the basic assertion of the neurodiversity movement that
phenotypes such as autism represent merely one end of a continuum of
human variation. Likewise, many families with autistic individuals
recognise lower levels of communicative difficulty and other autism-
associated features in non-diagnosed family members (Singh, 2016, pp.
160–161).
However, this picture may be too unidimensional. In both the Simple
Spectrum and Far End models, a staggering heterogeneity of phenotypic
variation is aggregated into a single continuous dimension; and a like-
wise staggering variety of genetic causation is aggregated into a unidi-
mensional measure of polygenic effect. As a heuristic for purposes of
quantifying large data sets, this is warranted. But awareness should be
maintained that this is a simplification of methodological convenience
rather than a full picture of the causal and phenotypic complexity asso-
ciated with autism, ADHD, and similar disabilities.
One way to unpack the unidimensional continuum conception is to
instead pick apart the various behavioural, cognitive, and neural traits
associated with ADHD and autism, an approach that yields a large set of
dimensional traits. Should research concentrate on those traits rather
than on disorder categorisations? Increasingly, that seems to be the
consensus: recall, for example, Tick et al.’s (2016) characterisation of
ASD as the far end of a spectrum of “ASD symptoms/behaviours” and
Faraone and Larsson's (2019) “clinically subthreshold traits”. In both
characterisations, a heterogeneous set of traits has explanatory primacy
over the autism or ADHD category.
This is the gist of the endophenotype approach. Also called inter-
mediate phenotypes, endophenotypes are traits that covary with a given
phenotype. For any complex phenotype, a candidate endophenotype is,
roughly, another phenotype that it is hoped would turn out to be a cause
or component of the complex phenotype, and therefore shed light on the
causal pathway from genotype to phenotype. In this section, I first
examine aspects of the endophenotype approach, after which I discuss
neurodiversity traits and their continuity on the Network Continua,
Complex Spectrum, and Emergent Far End models.
4.1. ADHD and autism endophenotypes
As the examples of Tick et al. and Faraone & Larsson illustrate, cor-
relation with genetic variance is held to be crucial in our choice of what
traits to examine and how they are to be understood. For geneticists,58traits are viable targets of inquiry qua candidate endophenotypes, i.e.,
they may help elucidate the causal patterns underlying complex pheno-
types like autism or ADHD.
There is modest divergence in the criteria set out for a trait to be a
suitable candidate endophenotype, but in broad strokes, the desiderata
proposed by various theorists converge. For example, Cannon & Keller's
six desiderata for candidate endophenotypes are that they should be
heritable; that they should be “associated with causes rather than effects
of disorders”; that there should be many endophenotypes for a given
complex phenotype; that endophenotypes should be subject to contin-
uous variation throughout the population; that they should lend them-
selves to multilevel measurement and analysis; and that such
endophenotypes that affect multiple phenotypes should occur in genet-
ically related phenotypes (Cannon & Keller, 2006).
Ideally, endophenotypes should be more strongly correlated with the
genetic effect than the phenotype is (Cannon & Keller, 2006; Kendler &
Neale, 2010; Beauchaine& Constantino, 2017), although there are many
approaches to the causal modelling of endophenotypes (Kendler&Neale,
2010). Suggested endophenotypes for ADHD include differences in ex-
ecutive functioning (Doyle et al., 2005; Friedman et al., 2008), reaction
time variability and delay aversion (Doyle et al., 2005); for autism,
suggested endophenotypes include differences in facial and emotion
recognition, sensory processing, and motor coordination (Rommelse
et al., 2011).
Autism and ADHD share in associated behavioural traits, and there is
also significant comorbidity between the two: 30–80% of autistic chil-
dren fulfil the diagnostic criteria for ADHD, and as for children diagnosed
with ADHD, 20–50% satisfy the diagnostic criteria for autism (Kernbach
et al., 2018). It increasingly appears that the major candidate cognitive
and behavioural endophenotypes apply to both autism and ADHD
(Rommelse et al., 2011). Additionally, shared neuroendophenotypes
such as ones pertaining to default mode dysfunction have been explored
(Kernbach et al., 2018).
The above endophenotypes have been suggested as viable targets of
study with potential to elucidate the causation of ADHD and autism. In
practice, any continuous trait associated with one or both diagnoses,
however, appears to satisfy most of Cannon & Keller's desiderata, albeit
some such traits are difficult to measure. Out of those desiderata, the
problem of ruling out reverse causation is the trickiest: endophenotypes
should be further up the causal chain from their associated phenotypes,
but whether a given trait is a cause or an effect of a disability or disorder
is hard to ascertain by correlation alone. While most of the traits asso-
ciated with autism or ADHD vary continuously, are heritable, occur in
genetically related conditions (given a fair dose of nosological caveats),
lend themselves to multilevel analysis, and are many traits to a diagnosis,
their research applicability as endophenotypes is limited due to poor
measurability and difficulty in foreclosing reverse causation.
The endophenotype approach is a natural ally for the quantitative
approach to genetics. Methods such as quantitative trait loci (QTL)
mapping endeavour to establish the genetic architecture of autism and
ADHD by focusing on specific dimensional traits and their architectures
(Abrahams & Geschwind, 2008).
Endophenotypic approaches have sometimes been hailed as inviting
improved specificity to psychiatric nosology, as identifying varied
endophenotypic pathways to ADHD or autism may help subtype it in
clinically meaningful ways (Iakoucheva, Muotri, & Sebat, 2019). For
example, due to the heterogeneity of both causal pathways and behav-
ioural presentations, the emerging consensus is that rather than one
autism, there are ‘multiple autisms’, although the precise way in which
autism ought to be subtyped continues to be debated (Singh, 2016;
Iakoucheva et al., 2019). The power of the endophenotype approach in
bringing clarity to the causation of complex phenomena ought not to be
overestimated, however: while endophenotypes can be found on any
level of explanation between genes and the complex phenotypic trait to
be explained, many of the candidate endophenotypes are themselves
complex traits, and uncovering their genetic architecture is no small feat.
P. Koi Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 89 (2021) 52–62While complex phenotypes can be endophenotypes for other complex
phenotypes, ascertaining causal relations between these is methodolog-
ically complicated, perhaps prohibitively so.
A further conceptual complication is that many endophenotypic traits
are shared between various diagnoses. For example, tics – associated
most prominently with Tourette's syndrome – may be found in ADHD,
autism and Tourette's populations alike even if the person does not have
multiple diagnoses.
If continuity of the ADHD, autism and Tourette's phenotypes is
assumed, the shared character of many associated traits would necessi-
tate conceiving of individuals in terms of multiple psychiatric phenotypes
at once, albeit to varying degrees. This, however, would be a vague and
misleading way to describe the shared endophenotypic landscape of
these disabilities: saying that a person with an ADHD diagnosis is also a
touch autistic or ‘within the broader autism phenotype’ would be a poor
way of expressing that they have some traits that autistic people also have
(save, of course, for persons with both disabilities). And if this is so, then
perhaps instead of speaking of a ‘broader autism phenotype’ or
describing the subclinical population as ‘a little bit ADHD’ we also ought
to be deflationist about those labels and identify specific traits rather
than appeal to the disability demarcation.
Looking into the continuity of associated traits without the further
assumption that their continuity suggests the continuity of specific
disability demarcations is therefore a more promising direction.
We thus end up with a picture of a broad set of traits that vary
continuously in the population, specific concentrations or combinations
of which are currently described as disabilities such as ADHD and autism.
That only some of these traits are promising for genetic research is due to
methodological constraints: all these traits are viable as characteristic
continua related to the complex phenotypes that extend to the general
population. The Simple Spectrum and Far End models described in sec-
tion 3 collate this multiplicity of quantitative traits into a unified
dimension. However, there are further alternatives to this approach.
These are examining each trait as a distinct dimension, with these traits
forming a causally interconnected network (the Network Continua
model); treating the traits as dimensions on a multidimensional,
continuous map of interpersonal difference (the Complex Spectrum
model); and conceiving of a sufficient convergence of endophenotypic
traits as a threshold on which the phenotype of autism or ADHD emerges
as a discrete kind (the endophenotypic Emergent Far End model). The
below section will discuss each approach in turn.
4.2. A network of many colours or a continuous spectrum?
As discussed above, not all heterogeneous sets constitute a unified
dimension: the heterogeneity of a category may be a ‘spectrum’ only in
the sense that it is diverse (while discontinuous), it may be a ‘spectrum’ in
the sense of a single continuous dimension, or it may be a ‘spectrum’ in
the stronger sense of beingmultidimensional. The distinction beingmade
here may be mistaken for splitting hairs: in all the various approaches
described here, both variability and continuity are highlighted. However,
in terms of the causal and metaphysical claims they make about autism
and ADHD, as well as the changes in future nosology they imply, there
are significant differences to these approaches.
It is however not always immediately clear which sort of diversity or
continuity a given speaker, whether in quantitative geneticist or a neu-
rodiversity self-advocate, is suggesting. For example, while parsing
ADHD and autism into multiple traits or dimensions is a way to account
for the individual variation within each category in a manner consistent
with the neurodiversity movement's suggestion that there is no one way
to be autistic, it leaves open whether these dimensions ought to be
conceived as causally interrelated, as well as whether these dimensions
are themselves discrete or whether dimensions of, e.g., social compe-
tence, sustained attention, and sensory responsivity are themselves
discrete or continuous with each other. I call these two approaches the
Network Continua model and the Complex Spectrum model, respectively.59For the Network Continua model, our research interest falls on a set of
discrete traits, many of which are continua, and which are placed in a
network of causal interrelatedness. For the Complex Spectrum model,
“the spectrum” is a vast multidimensional expanse of continuous – rather
than just interrelated – behavioural and neural variance.
The Network Continua model harkens to network models, which are
an approach within psychiatric theory. For such models, traits are
discrete but causally interconnected. Network models, such as are
defended, e.g., by Weiskopf (2017) for autism and by Kendler et al.
(2011) and Borsboom et al. (2019) for psychopathology in general, seek
to both define discrete nodes in a network and establish their inter-
connectedness. For network theories, the causal interconnectedness of
traits associated with diagnoses both explains why those traits so often
appear together, and explains the persistence of the disabilities in
question as traits causally contribute to sustaining each other. For
example, applying the network approach to ADHD, differences in
attentional guidance, sensory processing, mood regulation, and
impulsivity would causally contribute to each other, so that, e.g.,
attentional and sensory differences help explain mood dysregulation
and vice versa. The Network Continua model addresses the continuity
of ADHD and autism by recognising that each node in a network is
gradated: for example, that some persons with ADHD have only minor,
if any, differences in impulsivity.
Many of the nodes within network models can thus be described as
endophenotypic continua. Network models may have heuristic utility in
depicting and modelling multilevel causal connectivity, and sometimes
yield the promise that improved nosological specificity could be achieved
by observing how the discrete traits and features converge in a popula-
tion (see, e.g., Insel & Cuthbert, 2015).
In terms of quantitative genetics, however, the limitation of the
network approach is that the interpretation of any strong correlation of
two or more discrete dimensions is malleable: it can be variably inter-
preted either as suggesting their interconnectedness within a network, or
as suggesting that they ought not to be interpreted as a set of separate,
causally connected nodes but rather as constituting a single phenomenon.
This problem, however, is not specific for neurodiversity research but
rather presents itself for any approach seeking to probe the precise
relationship of complex yet correlated traits. Given that the data yield
multiple interpretations, theory may need to be selected on the basis of
heuristic utility, which in turn is domain specific. The network model for
psychiatry, even if deemed unsatisfactory for genetic research, may yet
be well suited for the clinical domain due to its relative clarity and
simplicity.
Endophenotypes also cut in the opposite direction of generality rather
than specificity. The presence of shared behavioural and neural endo-
phenotypes among psychiatric categories has lent credence to thinking of
ADHD and autism, not as continua to be further divided into narrower
categories, but rather as variants on a multidimensional spectrum of
human variation, an idea on which the Complex Spectrum model rests.
The Complex Spectrum model treats the continuity of autism and
ADHD across larger populations as one indication that individual dif-
ferences in human behaviour are gradated onmultiple dimensions. These
dimensions, for this model, overlap to such an extent that it is not just
that disabilities like ADHD and autism aren't discrete; the underlying
dimensional traits themselves are not discrete, either.
Some support for the Complex Spectrum model can be gleaned from
that in addition to trait overlap between dimensions of autism and ADHD
(Rommelse et al., 2011; Ghirardi et al., 2019), the two diagnoses also
overlap in genetic variation. This is unsurprising, because there is also
genetic overlap among psychiatric diagnoses in general (Gandal et al.,
2018; Sullivan & Geschwind, 2019). Recalling Cannon & Keller's desid-
erata for endophenotypes, this makes any trait that is a fitting endo-
phenotype for one psychiatric diagnosis is a candidate endophenotype
for psychiatric diagnoses in general.
Studies concerning the continuity of autism and ADHD across larger
populations describe each of these on a single dimension. From the
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accurate to describe those studies as quantifying the presence of multiple
neural and behavioural endophenotypic dimensions that the research
methodology aggregates. For this approach, it is noted that the neural
and behavioural endophenotypes of, e.g., autism also occur in people
with other diagnoses, such as ADHD, as well as in the subclinical popu-
lation. The precise concentration of (endophenotypic) traits, as well as
the current diagnostic guidelines and the expectations of clinicians, pa-
tients, and families, together influence whether the concentration is
treated as a matter of clinical attention, and if yes, which diagnosis is
deemed appropriate (see also Mandy, 2018).
There is, however, a final way in which to make sense of the presence
of ADHD and autism on such a broad range of endophenotypic variance.
This is the endophenotypic Far End Emergence model, on which a given
concentration of endophenotypic traits, rather than merely serving as a
heuristic of clinical or research convenience, gives rise to autism or
ADHD as a discrete kind. For this approach, the disability in question
emerges under certain conditions, one such condition being that a given
threshold of cumulative endophenotypic variance is reached. For
example, by describing the phenotype as a homeostatic property cluster
(Kendler et al., 2011), a causal connection between autism and its con-
stituent traits is maintained while further qualification is added, namely
that the various traits are causally interconnected – a causal connection
that may only emerge at a certain concentration of those endophenotypic
traits.
The endophenotypic Far End Emergence model is attractive because
it is capable of accounting for both the continuous distribution of endo-
phenotypic variance in a population and for discrete psychiatric pheno-
types. However, given the difficulties surrounding establishing causal
relations among complex traits, described above, it is unlikely that such a
model could in practice be verified as that would necessitate demarcating
which endophenotypic traits are to be aggregated under such a model
and computing their cumulative effect in such a manner that a similar
result would reliably yield a discrete disability phenotype. The prospects
of feasibility for such a feat of statistical analysis are slim.
The problem of empirical verification is not unique to the endophe-
notypic Far End Emergence model: all the models discussed in this paper
are characteristically theoretical and share the feature that their empir-
ical verification would be a difficult endeavour. However, models like the
Network Continua model, discussed above, or the Complex Spectrum
model, discussed below, lack the Far End Emergence model's reliance on
the success of such a verificatory process. For the Far End Emergence
model, there is a discrete disorder phenotype that psychiatry must un-
cover by identifying the location of the tipping point (conceivably, by
means of complex statistical analysis, described above) rather than
construct. By contrast, the Complex Spectrum and Network Continua
models postulate no discrete phenotype, instead accepting that psy-
chiatry's categories may be constructs whose validity depends not on the
discovery of a tipping point but rather on clinical utility, and hence the
feasibility of such an analysis is not as central an issue for those other
models.
4.3. The neurodiversity spectrum as a Complex Spectrum
As the above discussion shows, disabilities such as autism and ADHD
are causally and constitutively related to a large, heterogeneous set of
traits, individual differences in which are associated with the idea of
neurodiversity. This heterogeneity is typically conceived of as continuity.
As unidimensional continuity, such as is found in the Simple Spectrum
and Far End models, is acknowledged to be a heuristic and an aggrega-
tion of multiple dimensions. By contrast, thinking of neurodiversity in
terms of the Complex Spectrum model better enables the acknowledg-
ment and measurement of heterogeneity on various dimensions, being a
more faithful representation of the complex biological causation associ-
ated with disabilities like ADHD and autism. As a further advantage, the60model is well aligned with claims made about the nature of disabilities
like ADHD and autism both within genetic research and within the
neurodiversity movement.
On this picture of neurodiversity, disability demarcations exist on a
vast expanse of multidimensional, gradated variation. Within quantita-
tive genetic research, it is furthermore postulated that this highly com-
plex phenotypic variation tracks, and is caused by, genotypic variation.
However, the processes by which genotypes influence phenotypes are
complex, involving a multitude of gene-gene and gene-environment
interactions.
The complexity of psychiatric causation is a phenomenon not
restricted to disabilities on the neurodiversity spectrum: traits like ADHD
and autismmay well be examples of what Boyle, Li, and Pritchard (2017)
call the omnigenic model of genetic causation. For this controversial
model, “gene regulatory networks are sufficiently interconnected such
that all genes expressed in disease-relevant cells are liable to affect the
functions of core disease-related genes and that most heritability can be
explained by effects on genes outside core pathways” (Boyle et al., 2017,
p. 1177). Faraone and Larsson (2019), too, indicate some promise in
further probing an omnigenic model for ADHD. If Boyle, Li & Pritchard
are correct, it becomes hard to rule out any gene from the full picture of
genetic causation, although this does not foreclose focusing on genes
with sufficiently large impacts as a heuristic.
The variance of both traits and genetic effect across autism and ADHD
has invited much speculation about their interrelationship. In recent
years, the geneticists' and clinicians' perspective seems to have arrived at
a metaphysics that bears some resemblance to the neurodiversity
movement's notion of “the spectrum” on which various interconnected
forms of neurodiversity as well as ‘neurotypical’ human variation reside.
For example, Mandy (2018) muses the following:
[Autism] is part of a wider spectrum of neurodevelopmental atypi-
cality. This is shown by the fact that characteristic autistic symptoms
almost never occur in isolation, but comprise part of a constellation of
co-existing features, including behaviours that get labelled as
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), developmental co-
ordination disorder (DCD), oppositional defiant disorder, anxiety
conditions, and tic disorders, among others […] To describe an in-
dependent, circumscribed condition such as autism, as representing a
category which is distinct from ADHD, DCD and other conditions, is
to fail to describe the nature of human neurodevelopment as it really
is. (Mandy, 2018: 642)
The causal reasoning present in Mandy's analysis, above, amounts to
a trend in psychiatry and genetics towards conceptual and empirical
evidence that converges with the self-advocate notion of “the spec-
trum”, as described in section 2.2. Genetic approaches treating autism,
ADHD and related diagnoses as consisting of a multidimensional
expanse of underlying traits that are distributed across the population
come close to genetically validating the notion of “the spectrum”. The
spectrum – that is, the behavioural multiplicity of clinical and sub-
clinical neurodiversity – is best understood as endophenotypic and
multidimensional.
As Mandy's analysis illustrates, the Complex Spectrum model can be
interpreted as urging nominalism about conventional disorder de-
marcations. For some, including some proponents of the RDoC move-
ment, this is seen as an impetus to look for novel, reductionist approaches
to explaining phenotypic variation in such a way that would yield
discrete disorder phenotypes. However, if we take the notion of the
Complex Spectrum seriously, this should decrease our credence not just
in the discreteness of conventional diagnostic grouping but also in the
RDoC aim of identifying behavioural phenotypes that would be both
discrete and clinically significant.
If the Complex Spectrum model is accepted, then this urges epistemic
humility in the face of vast individual phenotypic difference and the
complexity of its causation. Adopting such a stance of humility, however,
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regard its categorisations – current, past and future – as its clinical in-
struments rather than its targets of inquiry.
5. Conclusion
In this exploratory paper, I have distinguished between various ways
in which the continuity of the autism and ADHD phenotypes can be
analysed. It is often not clear what type of continuity is intended in
evoking a ‘spectrum’ of disability. To help clarify this issue, I have offered
a taxonomy of models of continuity: the Simple Spectrum, Far End, and
Emergent Far End models, where the phenotypic variance is aggregated
on a single continuum, and the Network Continua and Complex Spectrum
models, which admit of multidimensionality.
Multidimensional, endophenotypic approaches to genetic causation,
described above, if successful, may come close to genetically validating
the conception of ‘the spectrum’: for them, behavioural and neural
endophenotypic traits are treated as the substrate on which we place our
categories of human normality and divergence. There is therefore some
convergence between the ways in which the neurodiversity movement
on one hand, and quantitative geneticists on the other, conceive of the
spectrum of neurodiversity. The Complex Spectrum model may suc-
cessfully integrate both quantitative genetics and self-advocacy ap-
proaches, but it also urges epistemic humility about the boundaries of
each diagnostic demarcation. Importantly, the causal relations it postu-
lates may not be verifiable. As a result, a multidimensional endopheno-
typic approach such as is encapsulated in the Complex Spectrum model
lends support to pragmatism, not reductionism, about neurodiversity and
connected diagnoses.
However, the relationship between the neurodiversity movement
and psychiatric genetics is complex. Above, I have discussed the mul-
tiple ways in which the approaches within quantitative genetics
increasingly converge with the metaphysical claims of the neuro-
diversity movement. But how does this way of thinking about genetics
impact the lives of autistic people and people with ADHD? Based on
previous research concerning the role of genetic information on lay re-
sponses (e.g., Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Lebowitz et al., 2016), it is
reasonable to hypothesise that genetic information on the continuity of
the spectrum may work to decrease stigma. But it may also strengthen
perceptions of traits as immutable and determined, including in sub-
clinical populations. The information can also lend further credence to
the aims and claims of the neurodiversity self-advocate movement.
However, it may also contribute to the harmful trend of discussions of
ADHD and autism being dominated by the voices of clinicians and ge-
neticists, with little space for the voices and insights of self-advocates.
Moreover, the multidimensional approach does nothing to alleviate
the worry that genetic research would ultimately seek to ‘cure’ or
remove autism from the diverse spectrum of human interpersonal dif-
ference. Genetic information, historically, has been a poor guide for how
to respond to diversity.
The perspectives of autistic people and people with ADHD continue to
be absent from discussions concerning genetics. Further research actively
engaging these stakeholder groups is urgently needed in order to ensure
their perspectives are integrated into the aims and claims of future
research.Acknowledgments
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